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We propose a long-distance continuous-variable quantum key distribution (CVQKD) with four-
state protocol using non-Gaussian state-discrimination detection. A photon subtraction operation,
which is deployed at the transmitter, is used for splitting the signal required for generating the
non-Gaussian operation to lengthen the maximum transmission distance of CVQKD. Whereby an
improved state-discrimination detector, which can be deemed as an optimized quantum measurement
that allows the discrimination of nonorthogonal coherent states beating the standard quantum limit,
is applied at the receiver to codetermine the measurement result with conventional coherent detector.
By tactfully exploiting multiplexing technique, the resulting signals can be simultaneously trans-
mitted through an untrusted quantum channel, and subsequently sent to the state-discrimination
detector and coherent detector respectively. Security analysis shows that the proposed scheme can
lengthen the maximum transmission distance up to hundreds of kilometers. Furthermore, by taking
finite-size effect and composable security into account we obtain the tightest bound of the secure
distance, which is more practical than that obtained in the asymptotic limit.
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) [1–3] is one of the
most practical applications of quantum cryptography,
whose goal is to provide an elegant way that allows two
remote legitimate partners, Alice and Bob, to establish
a sequence of random secure key over insecure quantum
and classical channels. Its security is provided by the
laws of quantum physics [4, 5].
For decades, continuous-variable (CV) QKD [6–13] has
been becoming a hotspot of QKD research due to its sim-
ple implementation with state-of-art techniques [14, 15].
It has been shown to be secure against arbitrary collec-
tive attacks, which are optimal in both the asymptotic
limit [12, 13, 16, 17] and the finite-size regime [18, 19].
Recently, CVQKD is further proved to be secure against
collective attacks in composable security framework [20],
which is the security analysis by carefully considering ev-
ery detailed step in CVQKD system.
In general, there are two main modulation approaches
in CVQKD, i.e., Gaussian modulated CVQKD [6–8] and
discretely modulated CVQKD [9–13]. In the first ap-
proach, the transmitter Alice usually continuously en-
codes key bits in the quadratures (xˆ and pˆ) of optical
field with Gaussian modulation [21], while the receiver
Bob can restore the secret key through high-speed and
high-efficiency coherent detector (i.e., homodyne or het-
erodyne detector) [15, 22]. This scheme usually has a
repetition rate higher than that of single-photon detec-
tions so that Gaussian modulated CVQKD could poten-
tially achieve higher secret key rate, whereas it seems
∗ Corresponding author: yingguo@csu.edu.cn
unfortunately limited to much shorter distance than its
discrete-variable (DV) counterpart [12]. The key prob-
lem is that the reconciliation efficiency β is quite low
for Gaussian modulation, especially in the long-distance
transmission. To solve this problem, one has to design
a perfect error correcting code which is more suitable
than LDPC code at very low signal-to-noise ratio (SNR).
However, this kind of error correcting code is relatively
hard to design and implement. Fortunately, there ex-
ist another way to well solve the problem, that is, using
discrete modulation such as the four-state CVQKD pro-
tocol, proposed by Leverrier et al. [13]. This discretely
modulated CVQKD generates four nonorthogonal coher-
ent states and exploits the sign of the measured quadra-
ture of each state to encode information rather than uses
the quadrature xˆ or pˆ itself. This is the reason that
the sign of the measured quadrature is already the dis-
crete value to which the most excellent error-correcting
codes are suitable even at very low SNR. Consequently,
the four-state CVQKD protocol has the merits of both
high reconciliation efficiency in the long-distance trans-
mission and the security proof of CVQKD so that it could
improve the maximal transmission distance of CVQKD.
Currently, photon-subtraction operation, which is a
kind of non-Gaussian operation in essence, has been
demonstrated theoretically and experimentally to extend
the transmission distance of the CVQKD using two-mode
entangled states [23–25] due to the fact that a suitable
photon-subtraction operation would increase the entan-
glement degree of two-mode entangled state and thereby
increase the correlation between the two output modes of
two-mode entangled state. Since the entanglement-based
(EB) scheme is equivalent to the prepare-and-measure
(PM) one, this operation can be employed practically
implemented in protocols using coherent states with ex-
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2isting technologies.
Furthermore, although a high-speed and high-
efficiency homodyne or heterodyne detector can be ef-
fectively to measure the received quantum state, the
inherent quantum uncertainty (noise) still prevents the
nonorthogonal coherent states from being distinguished
with perfect accuracy [26–28]. Even if the detector
is ideal with perfect detection efficiency, the receiver
cannot still obtain the precise result. The conven-
tional ideal detector can only achieve the standard quan-
tum limit (SQL) which defines the minimum error with
which nonorthogonal states can be distinguished by di-
rect measurement of the physical property of the light,
e.g. quadrature xˆ or pˆ. Actually, there exists a lower
error bound known as the Helstrom bound [29] which
is allowed by quantum mechanics, and this bound can
be achieved by designing excellent state-discrimination
strategies. Recently, a well-behaved state-discrimination
detector has been proposed to unconditionally discrimi-
nate among four nonorthogonal coherent states in QPSK
modulation [26]. This detector can beat the SQL by us-
ing photon counting and adaptive measurements in the
form of fast feedback and thus approach or achieve the
Helstrom bound. Therefore, the performance of CVQKD
would be improved by taking advantage of this well-
behaved state-discrimination detector.
Inspired by the afore-mentioned advantages, which
have been analyzed in theory and subsequently demon-
strated with simulations and experiments, in this pa-
per, we propose a long-distance CVQKD using non-
Gaussian state-discrimination detection. In stead of the
traditional Gaussian modulation which continuously en-
codes information into both quadrature xˆ and quadra-
ture pˆ, the discretely-modulated four-state CVQKD pro-
tocol is adopted as the fundamental communication pro-
tocol since it can well tolerate lower SNR, leading to
the long-distance transmission compared with Gaussian-
modulated counterpart. Meanwhile, a photon subtrac-
tion operation is deployed at the transmitter, where it
is not only used for splitting the incoming signal, but
also improving the performance of CVQKD as it has
been proven to be beneficial for lengthening the maxi-
mal transmission distance. Moreover, an improved state-
discrimination detector is applied at the receiver to code-
termine the measurement result with coherent detec-
tor. The state-discrimination detector can be deemed
as the optimized quantum measurement for the received
nonorthogonal coherent states so that it could surpass
the standard quantum limit. As a result, one can obtain
precise result of incoming signal in QPSK format with
the help of the state-discrimination detector. By exploit-
ing multiplexing technique, the yielded signals can be
simultaneously transmitted through an untrusted quan-
tum channel, and subsequently sent to the improved
state-discrimination detector and the coherent detector.
The proposed long-distance CVQKD scheme can greatly
increase the secure transmission distance and thus out-
performs the existing CVQKD protocols in terms of the
maximal transmission distance. Taking finite-size effect
and composable security into account we obtain the tight-
est bound of the secure distance, which is more practical
than that obtained in asymptotic limit.
This paper is structured as follows. In Sec. II, we
first introduce the discretely modulated CVQKD proto-
cols, in particular, the four-state CVQKD protocol, and
then demonstrate the proposed long-distance CVQKD
scheme. In Sec. III, we elaborate the characteristics
of photon-subtraction operation and the principle of im-
proved state-discrimination detector. Numeric simula-
tion and performance analysis are discussed in Sec. IV,
and finally conclusions are drawn in Sec. V.
II. LONG-DISTANCE CVQKD SCHEME
We consider the four-state CVQKD protocol as a
fundamental communication protocol for the proposed
scheme, since the discretely-modulated protocol is more
suitable for long-distance transmission (lower SNR) and
it could be extended larger than its Gaussian modulation
counterparts. Furthermore, the transmission distance of
the four-state CVQKD protocol can be enhanced by per-
forming a proper photon-subtraction operation and ap-
plying a well-behaved state-discrimination detector. To
make the derivation self-contained, in this section, we
first briefly describe the discretely modulated four-state
CVQKD protocol, and then give the detail structure of
the long-distance CVQKD scheme.
A. Four-state CVQKD protocol
In general, the four-state CVQKD protocol is derived
from discretely modulated CVQKD, which can be gen-
eralized to the one with N coherent states |αNk 〉 =
|αei2kpi/N 〉, where k ∈ {0, 1, ..., N} [10]. For the four-
state CVQKD protocol, we have |α4k〉 = |αei(2k+1)pi/4〉,
where k ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}, α is a positive number related to
the modulation variance of coherent state as VM = 2α
2.
Let us consider the PM version of the four-state
CVQKD protocol first. Alice randomly chooses one of
the coherent states |α4k〉 and sends it to the remote Bob
through a lossy and noisy quantum channel, which is
characterized by a transmission efficiency η and an ex-
cess noise ε. When Bob receives the modulated coherent
states, he can apply either homodyne or heterodyne de-
tector with detection efficiency τ and electronics noise
vel to measure arbitrary one of the two quadratures xˆ
or pˆ (or both quadratures). The mixture state that Bob
received can be expressed with the following form
ρ4 =
1
4
3∑
k=0
|α4k〉〈α4k|. (1)
After measurement, Bob then reveals the absolute values
of measurement results through a classical authenticated
3channel and keeps their signs. Alice and Bob exploit the
signs to generate the raw key. After conducting post-
processing procedure, they can finally establish a corre-
lated sequence of random secure key.
The PM version of the protocol is equivalent to the EB
version, which is more convenient for security analysis. In
EB version, Alice prepares a pure two-mode entangled
state
|Ψ4〉 =
3∑
k=0
√
λk|φk〉|φk〉
=
1
2
3∑
k=0
|ψk〉|α4k〉,
(2)
where the states
|ψk〉 = 1
2
3∑
m=0
ei(1+2k)mpi/4|φm〉 (3)
are the non-Gaussian states, and the state |φm〉 is given
by
|φk〉 = e
−α2/2
√
λk
∞∑
n=0
(−1)n α
4n+k√
(4n+ k)!
|4n+ k〉, (4)
with
λ0,2 =
1
2
e−α
2 [
cosh
(
α2
)± cos (α2)] , (5)
λ1,3 =
1
2
e−α
2 [
sinh
(
α2
)± sin (α2)] . (6)
Consequently, the mixture state ρ4 can be expressed by
ρ4 = Tr(|Ψ4〉〈Ψ4|)
=
3∑
k=0
λk|φk〉〈φk|.
(7)
Let A and B respectively denote the two output modes
of the bipartite two-mode entangled state |Ψ4〉, aˆ and
bˆ denote the annihilation operators applying to mode A
and B respectively. We have the covariance matrix ΓAB
of the bipartite state |Ψ4〉 with the following form
ΓAB =
(
XI Z4σz
Z4σz Y I
)
, (8)
where I and σz represent diag(1, 1) and diag(1,−1) re-
spectively, and
X = 〈Ψ4
∣∣1 + 2a†a∣∣Ψ4〉 = 1 + 2α2,
Y = 〈Ψ4
∣∣1 + 2b†b∣∣Ψ4〉 = 1 + 2α2,
Z4 = 〈Ψ4
∣∣ab+ a†b†∣∣Ψ4〉 = 2α2 3∑
k=0
λ
3/2
k−1λ
−1/2
k .
(9)
Note that the addition arithmetic should be operated
with modulo 4. The detailed derivation of the four-state
CVQKD protocol can be found in [12].
After preparing the two-mode entangled state |Ψ4〉
with variance V = 1 + VM , Alice performs projective
measurements |ψk〉〈ψk| (k = 0, 1, 2, 3) on mode A, which
projects another mode B onto a coherent state |α4k〉. Al-
ice subsequently sends mode B to Bob through the quan-
tum channel. Bob then applies homodyne (or hetero-
dyne) detection to measure the incoming mode B. Fi-
nally, the two trusted parties Alice and Bob extract a
string of secret key by using error correction and privacy
amplification.
B. Long-distance discretely modulated CVQKD
In what follows, we elaborate the long-distance dis-
cretely modulated CVQKD scheme. This novel scheme
is based on the four-state CVQKD protocol so that its
transmission distance could be extended more largely
comparing with the continuous modulation counterparts.
We focus on the principle of the whole long-distance
CVQKD scheme first, leaving the detailed techniques de-
scription to the next section.
As shown in Fig. 1, a source of the two-mode en-
tangled state [Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) state] is
used for creating a secure key [30]. After Alice prepares
the entangled state |Ψ4〉, she performs heterodyne de-
tection on one half (mode A) of the state and sends
another half (mode B) to the photon-subtraction op-
eration (the module within the green box). This non-
Gaussian operation is modeled by a beam splitter (BS)
with transmittance µ and a vacuum state |0〉 imports the
unused port of the beam splitter. As a result, the incom-
ing signal (mode B) is then divided into two parts by
the photon-subtraction operation. There are two advan-
tages for applying photon-subtraction operation. Firstly,
putting a proper non-Gaussian operation at Alice’s side
has been proven to be beneficial for lengthening the maxi-
mal transmission distance of the traditional CVQKD [25],
because this operation can be deemed the preparation
trusted noise controlled by Alice, which can well prevent
the eavesdropper from acquiring communication informa-
tion [23, 31]. Secondly, the photon-subtraction operation
tactfully provides a method to divide the incoming signal
into two parts, which are the mode B1 containing most
photons for homodyne (or heterodyne) detector and the
mode C containing a few subtracted j photons (or even
one) for state-discrimination detector respectively. The
two parts of signal are subsequently recombined by using
the polarization-multiplexing technique with a polariz-
ing beamsplitter (PBS). The recombinational mode B2
is then sent to the lossy and insecure quantum channel.
In the EB CVQKD scheme, the quantum channel is
replaced by an eavesdropper (say Eve) who performs
the collective Gaussian attack strategy. This attacks is
proved to be an optimal attack strategy in direct and
4FIG. 1. Schematic diagram of the long-distance CVQKD. Alice detects one half of EPR state (the blue box) using heterodyne
detection while another half is sent to the photon-subtraction module (the green box) which splits the incoming signal into two
parts. The two parts are then recombined by using polarization-multiplexing technique and subsequently sent to Bob. Eve
replaces the quantum channel and performs the optimal entangling cloner attack during the transmission. Bob demultiplexes
the incoming signal and measures one of them using homodyne or heterodyne detector, whereas the other mode is sent to the
state-discrimination detector (the purple box). BS denotes beam splitter, PBS denotes polarizing beamsplitter, DPC denotes
dynamic polarization controller, and PNRD stands for photon number resolving detector.
reverse reconciliation protocols. Very recently, Lever-
rier [32] shows that it is sufficient to prove the security
of CVQKD against collective Gaussian attacks in order
to obtain security against general attacks, therefore con-
firming rigorously the belief that collective Gaussian at-
tacks are indeed optimal against CVQKD. In this kind
of attacks, Eve usually prepares her ancillary system in
a product state and each ancilla interacts individually
with a single pulse sent by Alice, being later stored in a
quantum memory [33]. The tripartite state then reads,
ρABE =
[∑
a
P (a)|a〉〈a|a ⊗ ψaBE
]⊗n
. (10)
After eavesdropping the communication revealed by Al-
ice and Bob in the data post-processing, Eve applies the
optimal collective measurement on the ensemble of stored
ancilla to steal the secret information. In particular, Eve
can launch the so called entangling cloner [17, 21, 34] at-
tack which is a kind of collective Gaussian attack. Specif-
ically, Eve replaces the channel with transmittance η and
excess noise referred to the input χ by preparing the
ancilla |E〉 with variance W and a beam splitter with
transmittance η. The value W can be tuned to match
the noise of the real channel χline = (1− η)/η+ ε. After
that, Eve keeps one mode E1 of |E〉 and injects the mode
E2 into the unused port of the beam splitter and thus ac-
quires the output mode E3. After repeating this process
for each pulse, Eve stores her ancilla modes, E1 and E3,
in quantum memories. Finally, Eve measures the exact
quadrature on E1 and E3 after Alice and Bob reveal the
classical communication information. The measurement
of E1 allows her to decrease the noise added by E3.
After passing the untrusted quantum channel, Bob ap-
plies another PBS with dynamic polarization controller
(DPC) to demultiplex the incoming signal. One of the
demultiplexed modes B4 is then sent to Bob’s homodyne
or heterodyne detector which is modeled by a BS with
transmittance τ and its electronic noise is modeled by
an EPR state with variance vel. The mode D is syn-
chronously sent to the state-discrimination detector to
improve the system’s performance.
This long-distance CVQKD scheme subtly combines
the merits of the four-state CVQKD protocol and
photon-subtraction operation in terms of lengthening
maximal transmission distance, surpassing the SQL via
the state-discrimination detector.
III. TECHNIQUES
In this section we show the detailed characteris-
tics of the photon-subtraction operation and the state-
discrimination detector that can be used for beating the
SQL.
A. Photon-subtraction operation
As shown in Fig. 1, we suggest the EB CVQKD with
photon-subtraction operation (the green box) applied at
Alice’s station, where other modules are temporarily ig-
nored. Alice uses a beam splitter with transmittance µ
to split the incoming mode B and the vacuum state C0
into modes B1 and C. The yielded tripartite state ρACB1
can be expressed by
ρACB1 = UBS [|Ψ〉4〈Ψ|4 ⊗ |0〉〈0|]U†BS . (11)
Subsequently a photon-number-resolving detector
(PNRD, black dotted box at Alice’s side) is adopted to
measure mode C by applying positive operator-valued
5measurement (POVM) {Πˆ0, Πˆ1} [35]. The photon
number of subtraction j depends on Πˆ1 = |j〉〈j|. Only
when the POVM element Πˆ1 clicks can Alice and Bob
keep A and B1. The photon-subtracted state ρ
Πˆ1
AB1
is
given by
ρΠˆ1AB1 =
trC(Πˆ1ρACB1)
trACB1(Πˆ1ρACB1)
, (12)
where trX(·) is the partial trace of the multi-mode quan-
tum state and trACB1(Πˆ1ρACB1) is the success proba-
bility of subtracting j photons, which can be calculated
as
P Πˆ1(j) = trACB1(Πˆ1ρACB1)
= (1− ξ2)
∞∑
n=j
Cjnξ
2n(1− µ)jµn−j
=
(1− ξ2)(1− µ)jξ2j
(1− µξ2)j+1 ,
(13)
where Cjn is combinatorial number and ξ =
α√
1+α2
.
After passing the BS, it is worth noticing that the sub-
tracted state ρΠˆ1AB1 is not Gaussian anymore, while its
entanglement degree increases with the introduction of
the photon-subtraction operation [23, 25].
Due to the fact that heterodyne detection on one half
of the EPR state will project the other half onto a co-
herent state, which is convenient to implement in exper-
imentation, we take into account a situation where Alice
performs heterodyne detection and Bob executes homo-
dyne detection. Suppose Γ
(j)
AB1
represents the covariance
matrix of ρΠˆ1AB1 , and it can be given by
Γ
(j)
AB1
=
(
X ′I Z ′4σz
Z ′4σz Y
′I
)
, (14)
where
Z ′4 =
√
µξ(j + 1)
1− µξ2 ,
X ′ =
µξ2 + 2j + 1
1− µξ2 ,
Y ′ =
µξ2(2j + 1) + 1
1− µξ2 .
(15)
See [24] for the detailed calculations.
Note that for the proposed long-distance CVQKD
scheme, the PNRD which is placed at Alice’s side is re-
moved, whereas the subtracted mode C which is sup-
posed to enter the PNRD is recombined with mode B1
in a PBS by using polarization-multiplexing technique.
The task of resolving subtracted photon number is there-
fore handed over to the state-discrimination detector at
Bob’s side.
B. State-discrimination detector
We design a state-discrimination detector to increase
the performance of the CVQKD coupled with photon-
subtraction operation. This quantum detector can un-
conditionally discriminate four nonorthogonal coherent
states in QPSK modulation with the error probabilities
lower than the SQL.
As shown in Fig. 2, we depict the structure of the im-
proved state-discrimination detector using photon num-
ber resolving and adaptive measurements [36–38] in the
form of fast feedback. This state-discrimination detec-
tor contains M times adaptive measurements in the field
of |α〉. For each measurement i (i ∈ {0, 1, · · · ,M}),
the strategy first prepares a predicted state |βi〉 which
has the highest probability based on the current data in
classical memory. Subsequently, a displacement Dˆ(βi)
is adopted to displace |α〉 to |α − βi〉 and a PNRD is
used to detect the number of photons of the displaced
field. If the predicted state is correct, i.e., |βi〉 = |α〉,
Π0 will click, because the input field is displaced to vac-
uum so that the PNRD cannot detect any photon [26].
Note that different from the photon-subtraction opera-
tion where Π0 clicks represents the failure of subtracting
photon, Π0 clicks here denotes that the improved state-
discrimination strategy has correctly predicted the input
state. This successful prediction is marked as li = 0, oth-
erwise li = 1. After the i-th adaptive measurement, the
strategy calculates the posterior probabilities of all pos-
sible states (|αi0〉, |αi1〉,|αi2〉 and |αi3〉) using Bayesian
inference according to the present label history LHist and
predicted history DˆHist (Note that for now βi has aready
been added to the DˆHist with previous data to collec-
tively calculate these probabilities), and designates the
most probable state as |βi+1〉, which is deemed as an
input for next feedback. In each feedback period, the
probabilities of all possible states are updated dynami-
cally and the posterior probabilities of period i become
prior probabilities in period i + 1. The rule of Bayesian
inference can be expressed as
Ppo({|α〉}|βi, li) = AP(li|βi, {|α〉})Ppr({|α〉}), (16)
where Ppo({|α〉}|βi, li) and Ppr({|α〉}) are the posterior
and prior probabilities respectively, P(li|βi, {|α〉}) is con-
ditional Poissonian probability of observing the detection
result li for |α〉 displaced by field βi, and A is the normal-
ization factor calculated by summing Eq. (16) over all
possible states. Therefore, the final decision |βM+1〉 of
the input state |α〉 can be predicted in the last adaptive
measurement M using iterative Bayesian inference [28].
This kind of strategies could surpass the SQL and ap-
proach the Helstrom bound with the help of high band-
width and high detection efficiency. Mathematically, the
SQL for discriminating the four nonorthogonal coherent
state in QPSK modulation can be expressed by
PSQL = 1−
[
1− 1
2
erfc
(√ |α|2
2
)]2
, (17)
6FIG. 2. Schematic diagram of the improved state-
discrimination detector using photon number resolving and
adaptive measurements in the form of feedback.
where
erfc(x) =
2√
pi
∫ ∞
x
e−t
2
dt, (18)
and the Helstrom bound for the QPSK signals can be
approximated by using the square-root measure (SRM)
[10], which can be calculated by
PHel = 1− 1
16
( 4∑
k=1
√
ωk
)2
, (19)
where ωk = e
−α2∑4
n=1 exp[(1− k) 2piin4 + α2exp( 2piin4 )]
are eigenvalues of Gram matrix for QPSK signals. As the
improved state-discrimination detector is parallel with
homodyne or heterodyne detector at Bob’s side, the ulti-
mate detection of the states is codetermined by the coher-
ent detector and the state-discrimination detector. From
the perspective of information-theoretical sense, we can
define an improvement ratio ζ to depict how much per-
formance could the state-discrimination detector enhance
the CVQKD system, namely
ζ =
1− P (M)rec
1− PSQL ,
(20)
where P
(M)
rec represents the error probability of state-
discrimination detector with M adaptive measurements.
Theoretically, the detector could reach the Helstrom
bound when M is large enough. Therefore, the optimal
improvement ratio ζopt can be calculated by considering
the minimum error probability allowed by quantum me-
chanics. Thus we have
ζopt =
1− PHel
1− PSQL . (21)
In Fig. (3), we illustrate the error probabilities of dis-
criminating the four nonorthogonal coherent states and
FIG. 3. Error probabilities for discriminating QPSK states
and improvement ratio as functions of mean photon num-
ber 〈n〉. The dashed line denotes standard quantum limit,
the solid line denotes the state-discrimination detector with
10 adaptive measurements, the dotted line denotes Helstrom
bound and the red dashed line with squares denotes improve-
ment ratio.
the improvement ratio as functions of mean photon num-
ber 〈n〉. The blue dashed line shows the standard quan-
tum limit to which the conventional and ideal coherent
detector can achieve, while the blue solid line shows that
the state-discrimination detector with 10 adaptive mea-
surements is below the SQL and approaches the Hel-
strom bound (the blue dotted line). The red dashed
line with squares denotes the optimal improvement ra-
tio which descends quickly with the increased mean pho-
ton number but still above 1. Therefore, the proposed
detection strategy that consists of state-discrimination
detector and coherent detector could improve the perfor-
mance of CVQKD system, satisfying the requirement of
long-distance transmission.
IV. PERFORMANCE AND DISCUSSION
In this section, we show the performance of the pro-
posed long-distance CVQKD scheme with numeric simu-
lation results. To simplify the expression, we only focus
on a scenario that Bob performs homodyne detection and
reverse reconciliation (RR) in the data post-processing
procedure.
A. Parameter optimization
We first demonstrate the optimal values of simulated
parameters before giving the performance of secret key
rate. It is known that the optimal photon-subtraction op-
eration in Gaussian-modulated CVQKD can be achieved
7FIG. 4. Success probability of subtracting j photons for dis-
cretely modulated CVQKD with different transmittances µ.
The lines from top to bottom represent one-photon subtrac-
tion (blue line), two-photon subtraction (red line), three-
photon subtraction (yellow line), four-photon subtraction
(purple line) and five-photon subtraction (green line).
when only one photon is subtracted [23, 24], which
means that subtracting one photon is the preferred op-
eration to improve the transmission distance. For the
proposed long-distance discretely-modulated CVQKD
scheme, we show the success probability of subtracting
j (j = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5) photons as a function of transmittance
µ in Fig. (4). Similar to its Gaussian-modulated counter-
part, the success probability of subtracting one photon
(j = 1, blue line) outperforms other numbers of photon
subtraction and the success probability decreases with
the increase of the number of subtracted photons. Mean-
while, as shown in Fig. (3), the red dashed line with
squares depicts the improvement ratio of the improved
state-discrimination detector. It is obvious that the high-
est value of the improvement can be obtained with mean
photon number 〈n¯〉 = 1. This coincidence (j = 〈n¯〉 = 1)
allows us to obtain the optimal performance by tact-
fully combining photon-subtraction operation and state-
discrimination detector together. More specifically, the
one photon subtracted by photon-subtraction operation
at Alice’ side is detected by state-discrimination detector
at Bob’ side, and both modules perform optimally as one
photon meets the optimal requirements. Therefore, we
consider the optimal one-photon subtraction operation in
subsequent simulations to show the best performance of
the proposed scheme.
Because channel loss and excess noise are two of the
most important factors that would have an effect on the
performance of CVQKD system [39], the performance
of these parameters with different modulation variance
VM needs to be illustrated. In Fig. (5) and Fig. (6),
FIG. 5. Asymptotic secret key rate as a function of mod-
ulation variance VM in different channel losses with excess
noise ε = 0.01. Solid lines denote the proposed long-
distance CVQKD scheme with optimal one-photon subtrac-
tion, dashed lines represent the four-state CVQKD protocol.
Channel losses are set to 12 dB (blue lines), 16 dB (red lines),
20 dB (yellow lines) and 24 dB (green lines), respectively. In-
set (a) is the extended graph with VM to 10. Inset (b) shows
the optimal µ for the current secret key rate as a function of
modulation variance VM .
FIG. 6. Asymptotic secret key rate as a function of modula-
tion variance VM in different excess noises with transmission
distance d = 100 km. Solid lines denote the proposed long-
distance CVQKD scheme with optimal one-photon subtrac-
tion, dashed lines represent the four-state CVQKD protocol.
Excess noises are set to 0.002 (blue lines), 0.005 (red lines),
0.008 (yellow lines) and 0.01 (green lines), respectively. Inset
(a) is the magnified graph with VM limited from 0.12 to 0.13.
Inset (b) shows the optimal µ for the current secret key rate
as a function of modulation variance VM .
8solid lines denote the performance of the proposed long-
distance CVQKD scheme with the optimal one-photon
subtraction operation, while dashed lines represent the
four-state CVQKD protocol as a comparison, and their
secret key rates change as VM changes. The global simu-
lation parameters are as follows: reconciliation efficiency
is β = 95%, quantum efficiency of Bob’s detection is
τ = 0.6 and electronic noise is vel = 0.05. In Fig. (5),
excess noise ε and other parameters are fixed to legiti-
mate values, the numerical areas of VM are compressed
for the four-state CVQKD protocol when channel loss
increases, and the secret key rate decreases rapidly with
the increase of channel loss. While for the proposed long-
distance CVQKD scheme, VM can be set to a large range
of values and its secret key rate increases with the in-
creased VM even though the secret key rate also decreases
as channel loss increases, which means the performance
of the proposed long-distance CVQKD scheme would be
consecutively improved theoretically when the modula-
tion variance is set large enough. However, this can-
not be realized in practice, thus the modulation variance
VM must be set to a reasonable value in simulations. In
Fig. (6), transmission distance, which is proportional to
the channel loss (0.2 dB/km), and other parameters are
fixed. For the four-state CVQKD protocol, its optimal
regions of VM are also compressed with the increased
excess noise ε. Fortunately, there is only slight impact
on the proposed long-distance CVQKD scheme with one-
photon subtraction when excess noise ε changes. It shows
the proposed scheme greatly outperforms the four-state
CVQKD protocol in terms of tolerable channel excess
noise. The reasons may be given as follows. Firstly, ex-
cess noise can be deemed channel imperfections which de-
teriorate the correlation between the two output modes,
while photon-subtraction operation can well enhance the
correlation which is positively related to entanglement
degree of EPR state and thus improves the performance
of CVQKD system [23, 25]. Rendering the CVQKD
system that applied this non-Gaussian operation toler-
ates more higher excess noise. Secondly, the proposed
long-distance CVQKD scheme is not very sensitive to
the noise with the help of state-discrimination detector,
which means Bob can obtain more correct results with-
out performing very precise measurement on quadrature
xˆ or/and pˆ. The reason is that the raw key in Gaussian
modulated CVQKD protocol is tremendously affected by
channel excess noise (and imperfect coherent detector)
since its information is directly encoded in quadratures.
In the four-state CVQKD protocol, the information is en-
coded in QPSK modulation which can be unconditionally
discriminated by the state-discrimination detector [26].
Therefore, the detection strategy could predict incom-
ing state using probability-based method, i.e. Bayesian
inference, thus alleviating the impact of excess noise.
B. Secret key rates
Up to now, we have derived the parameters that may
largely affect the CVQKD system. In what follows, we
consider the secret key rate of the proposed CVQKD
scheme. In general, the asymptotic secret key rate can
be calculated with the form
Kasym = βI(A : B)− S(E : B), (22)
where β is the efficiency for RR, I(A : B) is the Shan-
non mutual information between Alice and Bob, and
S(E : B) is the Holevo bound [40] of the mutual informa-
tion between Eve and Bob. For the proposed CVQKD
protocol, the asymptotic secret key rate in Eq. (22) can
be rewritten by
Kasym = P
Πˆ1
(j) [βζoptI(A : B)− S(E : B)]. (23)
As previously mentioned, P Πˆ1(j) represents the probability
of successful subtracting j photons and ζopt depicts the
improvement ratio of the introduced state-discrimination
detector. Detailed calculation of the asymptotic secret
key rate can be found in Appendix A.
In Fig. (7), we depict the asymptotic secret key rate as
a function of transmission distance for the CVQKD pro-
tocol. Red line shows the original four-state protocol pro-
posed in [13], yellow line denotes the optimal one-photon
subtraction scheme for Gaussian modulated coherent
state proposed in [24], blue line represents the scheme of
four-state protocol with one-photon subtraction, and the
green line denotes the proposed long-distance CVQKD
scheme using non-Gaussian state-discrimination detec-
tor. The modulation variance VM of above protocols is
optimized except for the proposed long-distance CVQKD
scheme since its secret key rate is monotonic increasing
in a large range of the modulation variance VM , which
means that the performance of the proposed scheme can
be further improved when VM is set to larger value. How-
ever, from the perspective of fair comparison and practi-
cal significance, the modulation variance VM of the pro-
posed long-distance CVQKD scheme is reasonably set as
same as its fundamental communication protocol, i.e.,
the four-state CVQKD protocol. As shown in Fig. (7),
the proposed long-distance CVQKD scheme outperforms
all other CVQKD protocols in terms of maximum trans-
mission distance up to 330 km. Therefore, the proposed
long-distance CVQKD scheme using non-Gaussian state-
discrimination detector could be more suitable for long-
distance transmission. Note that this distance record is
limited by the secret key rate more than 10−6 bits per
pulse, and it can be further extended when one considers
the secret key rate below this bound.
In addition, finite-size effect [41] needs to be taken
into consideration, since the length of secret key is im-
possibly unlimited in practice. Moreover, one can make
the assumption in the asymptotic case that the quan-
tum channel is perfectly known before the transmission
9FIG. 7. Asymptotic secret key rate as a function of trans-
mission distance with excess noise ε = 0.01. Red line shows
the original four-state protocol, yellow line denotes the opti-
mal one-photon subtraction scheme for Gaussian modulated
coherent state, blue line represents the scheme of four-state
protocol with one-photon subtraction, and the green line de-
notes the proposed long-distance scheme using non-Gaussian
state-discrimination detector.
is performed, while in finite-size scenario, one actually
does not know the characteristics of the quantum chan-
nel in advance. Because a part of exchanged signals has
to be used for parameter estimation rather than gen-
erates the secret key. As shown in Fig. (8), the per-
formance of the proposed CVQKD scheme in finite-size
regime is outperformed by that obtained in asymptotic
limit. The maximum transmission distance significantly
decreases when the number of total exchanged signals N
decreases. However, it still has a large improvement when
comparing with original four-state CVQKD protocol and
its Gaussian-modulated protocol counterpart which also
take finite-size effect into account. Notice that the per-
formance in the finite-size regime will converge to the
asymtotic case if N is large enough. The detailed calcu-
lation of secret key rate in the finite-size regime can be
found in Appendix B.
Finally, we demonstrate the performance of the pro-
posed long-distance CVQKD scheme in composable se-
curity framework. The composable security is the en-
hancement of security based on uncertainty of the finite-
size effect [18] so that one can obtain the tightest se-
cure bound of the protocol by carefully considering every
detailed step in CVQKD system [20]. In Fig. (9), we
show the secret key rate of the proposed long-distance
CVQKD scheme with one-photon subtraction operation
in the case of composable security, as a function of to-
tal exchanged signals N . The performance is more pes-
simistic than that obtained in the finite-size regime, let
alone in the asymptotic limit. For example, assuming
FIG. 8. Finite-size secret key rate of the proposed long-
distance CVQKD scheme with one-photon subtraction as a
function of transmission distance. The excess noise is set to
ε = 0.01. From left to right, the solid lines correspond to
block lengths of N = 108, 1010, 1012, 1014, 1015 and 1016, and
the red dashed line denotes the asymptotic case. The secret
key rate is null for a block length of 104.
that N = 1014 and the minimal secret key rate is lim-
ited to above 10−6 bis per pulse, the maximal transmis-
sion distance in finite-size regime is approximate 320 km
(purple line in Fig. (8)), while the maximal transmission
distance is reduced to approximate 260 km (light blue
line in Fig. (9)) when one considers the proposed scheme
in composable security framework. Therefore, the com-
posable security, which takes the failure probabilities of
every step into account, is the strictest theoretic security
analysis of CVQKD system so that one can obtain more
practical secure bound. In addition, the composable se-
cret key rate also approaches the asymptotic value for
very large N (dashed lines). The detailed calculation of
the secret key rate for composable security is shown in
Appendix C.
The asymptotic limit, the finite-size scenario and
the composable security framework are the efficient ap-
proaches to evaluate the performance of CVQKD sys-
tem. Although the results vary with the different ap-
proach, the trends of the performance are similar. There-
fore, the proposed long-distance CVQKD using non-
Gaussian state-discrimination detector can beat other
existing CVQKD protocols in terms of maximal trans-
mission distance and thus meet the requirement of long-
distance transmission.
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FIG. 9. Composable secret key rate of the proposed long-
distance CVQKD with one-photon subtraction as a function
of N , the number of exchanged signals. From top to bottom,
solid lines denote the distances of d = 40, 80, 120 and 160
km. The dashed lines correspond to the respective asymp-
totic case. Inset shows the composable secret key rate of the
proposed scheme at long-distance range, the lines from top to
bottom denote the distances of d = 260, 280, 300 and 320 km,
respectively. Excess noise is ε = 0.01, discretization parame-
ter is d = 5, robustness parameter is rob ≤ 10−2 and security
parameter is  = 10−20. Other intermediate parameters can
be found in Appendix C.
V. CONCLUSION
We have suggested a novel long-distance CVQKD us-
ing non-Gaussian state-discrimination detector. The
discretely-modulated four-state CVQKD protocol is
adopted as the fundamental communication protocol
since it can well tolerate the lower SNR and hence it
is more suitable for the long-distance transmission com-
pared with Gaussian-modulated counterpart. We deploy
a non-Gaussian operation, i.e. photon-subtraction oper-
ation at the transmitter, where the photon-subtraction
operation is not only used for splitting the signal, but
also used for lengthening the transmission distance of
CVQKD. Meanwhile, an improved state-discrimination
detector is applied at the receiver to codetermine the
measurement result with coherent detector. The state-
discrimination detector can be deemed as the optimized
quantum measurement for the received nonorthogonal
coherent states, beating the standard quantum limit us-
ing adaptive measurements in the form of fast feedback.
Therefore, Bob can obtain more precise result of incom-
ing signal in the QPSK modulation with the help of
the state-discrimination detector. By exploiting multi-
plexing technique, the yielded signals are simultaneously
transmitted through an untrusted quantum channel, and
subsequently sent to the state-discrimination detector
and coherent detector, respectively. Security analysis
shows that the proposed scheme can lengthen the max-
imal transmission distance, and thus outperform other
existing CVQKD protocols. Furthermore, by taking the
finite-size effect and the composable security into ac-
count we obtain the tightest bound of the secure distance,
which is more practical than that obtained in asymptotic
limit. In terms of possible future research, it would be
interesting to design an experiment to implement this
long-distance CVQKD scheme for its practical security
analysis.
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Appendix A: Calculation of asymptotic secret key
rate
We consider the calculation of asymptotic secret key
rates of the proposed long-distance CVQKD scheme
where Alice performs heterodyne detection and Bob
performs homodyne detection respectively. Note that
the state ρΠˆ1AB1 is not Gaussian anymore after photon-
subtraction operation, we thus cannot directly use re-
sults of the conventional Gaussian CVQKD to calculate
the secret key rate. Fortunately, the secret key rate of
state ρΠˆ1AB1 is more than that of the Gaussian state ρ
Gˆ
AB1
counterpart which has the identical covariance matrix
according to extremity of the Gaussian quantum states
[21, 42, 43]. Therefore, the lower bound of the asymp-
totic secret key rate under optimal collective attack can
be given by
Kasym = P
Πˆ1
(j) [βζoptI(A : B)− S(E : B)], (A1)
where β is the efficiency for reverse reconciliation, I(A :
B) is the Shannon mutual information between Alice and
Bob, and S(E : B) is the Holevo bound [40] of the mutual
information between Eve and Bob.
Assuming that Alice’s heterodyne detection and PBSs
used for multiplexing are perfect, and Bob’s homodyne
detector is characterized by an transmittance τ and elec-
tronic noise vel, then the detection-added noise referred
to Bob’s input can be given by χhom = [(1− τ) + vel]/τ .
In addition, the channel-added noise is expressed by
χline = (1− η)/η + ε. Therefore, the total noise referred
to the channel input can be calculated by
χtot = χline + χhom/η
=
1 + vel
τη
− 1 + ε. (A2)
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After passing the untrusted quantum channel, the covari-
ance matrix Γ
(j)
AB3
has the form as follows
Γ
(j)
AB3
=
(
aI cσz
cσz bI
)
=
(
X ′I √ηZ ′4σz√
ηZ ′4σz η(Y
′ + χline)I
)
.
(A3)
As a result, the Shannon mutual information between
Alice and Bob, I(A : B), can be calculated by
I(A : B) =
1
2
log2
VA
VA|B
, (A4)
where VA = (a+ 1)/2, VB = b and
VA|B = VA − ηZ
′2
4
2VB
= a− c
2
2b
.
(A5)
After Bob applies homodyne measurement, Eve pu-
rifies the whole system so that the mutual information
between Eve and Bob can be expressed as
S(E : B) = S(E)− S(E|B)
= S(AB)− S(A|B)
= G[(κ1 − 1)/2] +G[(κ2 − 1)/2]
−G[(κ3 − 1)/2]−G[(κ4 − 1)/2],
(A6)
where the Von Neumann entropy G(x) is given by
G(x) = (x+ 1)log2(x+ 1)− xlog2x, (A7)
and the symplectic eigenvalues κ1,2,3,4 can be calculated
by
κ21,2 =
1
2
(A±
√
A2 − 4B), (A8)
and
κ23,4 =
1
2
(C ±
√
C2 − 4D), (A9)
with
A = V 2 + η2(V + χline)
2 − 2ηZ ′24 ,
B = η(V 2 + V χline − Z ′24 )2,
C =
Aχhom + V
√
B + η(V + χline)
η(V + χtot)
,
D =
√
B
V +
√
Bχhom
η(V + χtot)
.
(A10)
Appendix B: Secret key rate in the finite-size
scenario
In the traditional CVQKD protocol, the secret key rate
calculated by taking finite-size effect into account is ex-
pressed as [41]
Kfini =
n
N
[βI(A : B)− SPE (E : B)−∆(n)], (B1)
where β and I(A : B) are as same as the afore-mentioned
definitions, N denotes the total exchanged signals and n
denotes the number of signals that is used for sharing key
between Alice and Bob. The remained signals m = N−n
is used for parameter estimation. PE is the failure prob-
ability of parameter estimation and the parameter ∆(n)
is related to the security of the privacy amplification,
which is given by
∆(n) = (2dimHB + 3)
√
log2(2/¯)
n
+
2
n
log2(1/PA),
(B2)
where ¯ is a smoothing parameter, PA is the failure prob-
ability of privacy amplification, and HB is the Hilbert
space corresponding to the Bob’s raw key. Since the
raw key is usually encoded on binary bits, we have
dimHB = 2. For the proposed long-distance CVQKD
scheme, the secret key rate in Eq. (B1) can be rewritten
as
Kfini =
nP Πˆ1(j)
N
[βζoptI(A : B)− SPE (E : B)−∆(n)].
(B3)
In the finite-size scenario, SPE (E : B) needs to be cal-
culated in parameter estimation procedure where one can
find a covariance matrix ΓPE which minimizes the secret
key rate with a probability of 1− PE and can be calcu-
lated by m couples of correlated variables (xi, yi)i=1···m
in the following form
ΓPE=
(
X ′I tZ ′4σz
tZ ′4σz (t
2X ′ + σ2)I
)
, (B4)
where t =
√
η and σ2 = 1 + η(ε − 3) are compatible
with m sampled data except with probability PE/2. The
maximum-likelihood estimators tˆ and σˆ2 respectively has
the follow distributions
tˆ ∼ (t, σ2∑m
i=1 x
2
i
)
and
mσˆ2
σ2
∼ χ2(m− 1), (B5)
where t and σ2 are the authentic values of the parame-
ters. In order to maximize the value of the Holevo infor-
mation between Eve and Bob with the statistics except
with probability PE , we compute tmin (the lower bound
of t) and σ2max (the upper bound of σ
2) in the limit of
large m, namely
tmin =
√
η − zPE/2
√
1 + η(ε− 3)
mX ′
,
σ2max = 1 + η(ε− 3) + zPE/2
√
2[1 + η(ε− 3)]√
m
,
(B6)
where zPE/2 is such that 1− erf(zPE/2/
√
2)/2 = PE/2
and erf is the error function defined as
erf(x) =
2
pi
∫ x
0
e−t
2
dt. (B7)
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TABLE I. The parameters of the proposed scheme in the com-
posable security framework
parameter definition
N total number of exchanged light pulses.
n size of final key if the protocol did not abort.
d number of bits on which each measurement
result is encoded.
leakEC size of Bob’s communication to Alice during
error correction step.
PE maximum failure probability of parameter
estimation step.
cor small probability of the failure that the keys of
Alice and Bob do not identical and the protocol
did not abort.
nPE number of bits that Bob sends to Alice during
parameter estimation step.
Ωmaxa ,Ω
max
b , bounds on covariance matrix elements, which
Ωminc must be apt in the realization of the protocol.
The above-mentioned error probabilities can be set to
¯ = PE = PA = 10
10. (B8)
Finally, one can calculate the secret key rate in the finite-
size scenario using the derived bounds tmin and σ
2
max.
Appendix C: Secret key rate of the CVQKD in
composable security
We detail the generation of secret key rate of the pro-
posed long-distance CVQKD scheme provided by com-
posable security framework. In Tab. I, we show the
definition of parameters in the composable security case.
Before the calculation, we give a theorem of composable
security for the proposed scheme [20].
The proposed long-distance CVQKD protocol is -
secure against collective attacks if  = 2sm++PE/+
cor/+ent/ and if the final key length n is chosen such
that
n ≤ 2NHˆMLE(U)−NF (Ωmaxa ,Ωmaxb ,Ωminc )
− leakEC −∆AEP −∆ent − 2 log 1
2
,
(C1)
where HˆMLE(U) is the empiric entropy of U , the
maximum likelihood estimator (MLE) of H(U) to be
HˆMLE(U) = −
∑2d
i=1 pˆi log pˆi with pˆi =
nˆi
dN denotes the
relative frequency of obtaining the value i, and nˆi is the
number of times the variable U takes the value i for
i ∈ {1, · · · , 2d}, F is the function computing the Holevo
information between Eve and Bob, and
∆AEP =
√
N(d+ 1)2 +
√
16N(d+ 1) log2
2
2sm
+
√
4N log2
2
2sm
− 4smd

,
(C2)
∆ent = log2
1

−
√
4N log2(2N) log(2/sm). (C3)
Now, we consider the calculation of secret key rate of
the proposed long-distance CVQKD scheme provided by
composable security framework. Since the transmission
channel is characterized by transmissivity η and excess
noise ε, the following model is used for error correction
βI(A : B) = 2HˆMLE(U) − 1
2n
leakEC , (C4)
where I(A : B) represents the mutual information be-
tween Alice and Bob, β denotes the reconciliation effi-
ciency. For the proposed protocol, we obtain
I(A : B) =
1
2
log2(1 + SNR)
=
1
2
log2
(
1 +
ηVM
2 + ηε
)
.
(C5)
Moreover, assuming that the success probability of pa-
rameter estimation is at least 0.99, and hence the ro-
bustness of the proposed protocol is rob ≤ 10−2. Conse-
quently, the values of random variables ||X||2, ||Y ||2 and
〈X,Y 〉 satisfy the following restraints
||X||2 ≤ (N + 3
√
N)X ′, (C6)
||Y ||2 ≤ η(N + 3
√
N)(Y ′ + χline), (C7)
〈X,Y 〉 ≥ (N − 3
√
N)
√
ηZ ′4, (C8)
The above-mentioned restraints can be achieved from the
covariance matrix Γ
(j)
AB3
of the proposed CVQKD scheme.
According to these bounds, we have the definations
Ωmaxa =
||X||2
N
[
1 + 2
√
log(36/PE)
N/2
]
− 1, (C9)
Ωmaxb =
||Y ||2
N
[
1 + 2
√
log(36/PE)
N/2
]
− 1, (C10)
Ωminc =
〈X,Y 〉
N
−5(||X||2 + ||Y ||2)
√
log(8/PE)
(N/2)
3 . (C11)
Finally, we can calculate the secret key rate of the pro-
posed scheme provided by composable security as follows
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Kcomp = P
Πˆ1
(j) (1− rob){βζoptI(A : B)− F (Ωmaxa ,Ωmaxb ,Ωminc )−
1
N
(∆AEP + ∆ent + 2 log2
1
2ε
)}. (C12)
In addition, we should optimize over all parameters
compatible with  = 10−20. However, in order to simplify
the data process, we make the following choices
sm =  = 10
−21, PE = cor = ent = 10−41. (C13)
which slightly sub-optimizes the performance of the pro-
posed CVQKD protocol [20].
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